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Abstract The problem of developing a decision support system for estimating a)
the scale of incorporating available renewable sources of energy (such as solar and
wind energy) in a part of a country’s electrical grid (called a regional electrical grid
further in this paper), and b) the scale of storing electricity in this (regional) electrical
grid to make these renewable sources of electric power competitive with traditional
power generators (such as fossil-fuel and nuclear ones) and to reduce the cost of
acquiring electricity from all the electric power generating facilities in the grid is
considered. In the framework of this system, renewable sources of energy are viewed
as electricity generating facilities under both existing and expected electricity prices,
and the uncertainty of energy supply from themand the uncertainty of the grid customer
demand for electricity during every 24h are taken into account. Amathematical model
underlying the system allows one to study the interaction of all the grid elements as a
game with a finite (more than three) number of players on a polyhedron of connected
player strategies (i.e., strategies that cannot be chosen by the players independently
of each other) in a finite-dimensional space. It is shown that solving both parts of the
problem under consideration is reducible to finding Nash equilibrium points in this
game.
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1 Introduction
Problems associated with incorporating renewable sources of energy and systems for
effectively storing electricity in electrical grids can be divided into two groups. The
first group is formed by problems of developing
a) effective physical and chemical methods for transforming wind, solar, and other
types of energy received from renewable sources of energy into electricity and
those for storing electricity in large, medium, and small volumes, and
b) particular systems for transforming energy from renewable sources of energy into
electricity and systems and devices for storing electricity that function based on
these methods.
The second group of these problems implies effectively incorporating in the grid
both systems for transforming energy from renewable sources of energy into elec-
tricity and electricity storage systems in electrical grids, functioning, in particular, in
every developed country. This means that both types of the systems should become
an effective tool for smoothing fluctuations of the customer demand for electricity
(which substantially effect production schedules of base load power plants) and mak-
ing renewable sources of energy competitive with fossil-fuel and nuclear base load
power stations.
The present paper concerns a systems approach to studying the second group of the
problems by means of a) mathematical models designed to describe the functioning
of renewable sources of energy and electricity storing systems as part of a country’s
electrical grid, and b) mathematical methods for both analyzing the expediency and
determining optimal scales of incorporating renewable sources of energy and the
storing systems in particular electrical grids.
A description of the functioning of an electrical grid of a country is a complicated
task, and studying this system presents considerable difficulties. Unstable world prices
on fossil fuels [1,2], which are used for generating electric energy at many power
stations, an uncertain customer demand for electricity during different day, evening,
and night hours [3], a rapidly growing deployment of renewable sources of energy,
especially those of wind and solar energy, for obtaining electricity [4–6], and the
uncertainty causedby the liberalization of lawsgoverning the operation of the electrical
grid [7,8] represent only a few major factors that should be taken into consideration in
choosing directions of keeping the grid responsive to public needs, as well as to those
of both private and public sectors of the country’s economy in general.
The physics of electricity production by base load power plants (including fossil-
fuel and nuclear ones) imposes certain constraints on the production schedule for every
generating facility, and the problem of finding an optimal supply from the base load
power plants, taking into account the above uncertainties [9,10], is a challenge.
Currently, there are two viewpoints on how to operate base load power plants under
deregulation measures that have been in force in many countries. The first one implies
a) signing both long-term and interruptible agreements with large customers, such
as industries, businesses, and utility companies for supplying them on a permanent
basis with a particular volume of electric energy for each such customer at a fixed
price while offering the “overproduced” volume of electricity for sale via auctions
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on electricity spot markets [11–13], and b) deploying peaking power plants to meet
the demand for electric energy that exceeds the expected level of its consumption.
The second one consists of selling most of the electricity produced via wholesale and
retail markets in which retailers compete for buying electricity for their customers.
Approaches to operating base load power plants reflecting both viewpoints havemerits
and deficiencies [14,15], and a lot depends on what amounts of money the electricity
producers and the consumers would agree to receive and to pay, respectively, for the
electricity to be supplied and to be bought.
Under either viewpoint, it is clear that effectively storing electricity can substantially
change the way base load power plants operate, since both electricity producers and
the grid customers can store electricity and benefit from doing this on account of
smoothing fluctuations of the grid customer demand. It seems to be the most important
with respect to renewable sources of energy, first of all, to those transforming the wind
and solar power into electric power, which can be deployed by both the producers
and the grid customers. Moreover, the ability to store electricity is the key to making
the renewable sources of energy competitive with such traditional facilities producing
electricity as fossil-fuel and nuclear base load power plants.
The aim of this paper is to propose mathematical tools underlying decision support
systems for analyzing a part of a country’s electrical grid, which is formed by a set
of generating facilities (both traditional and those transforming solar and wind power
into electric power), a set of electricity storing facilities, a set of large customers
(businesses, industries, electric energy retailers, etc.), and a transmission company.
(For the sake of simplifying the terminology, a part of a country’s electrical grid under
consideration in this paper is further called a regional electrical grid though it is clear
that such a grid can provide services for several geographic regions.) Particularly,
such tools should allow one a) to find an optimal constant hourly production volume
for every base load power plant deployed in the grid under consideration, along with
optimal volumes of electricity to be bought by the grid customers every hour during
every 24h, and b) to evaluate an optimal scale of using both the available facilities
transformingwind and solar energy into electricity and the available electricity storage
facilities for each type of the customers in the grid under consideration under both
the existing and any expected prices for electricity from all the available sources of
electric power in the grid.
The interaction of all the electricity producers serving the regional grid customers,
the transmission company, and the (large) electricity consumers (who can receive
electricity from wind and solar sources of energy and who have access to electricity
storing facilities) is the subject of the mathematical modeling of the grid functioning
undertaken in this paper. It is shown that under some natural, verifiable assumptions,
a) this interaction can be described as a game with a finite (more than three) number
of players on polyhedra of player strategies being vectors in a finite-dimensional
space, where strategies of some of the players are connected, i.e., cannot be chosen
by the players independently of each other,
b) the above optimal values of the (constant) electricity production volumes either
are components of equilibrium points in this game or are determined by these
components, and
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c) the optimal volumes of electricity to be stored by all the interested grid customers
under both the existing and expected electricity prices from all the sources avail-
able in the grid (both traditional and renewable ones) are also components of the
equilibrium points of the above game.
Mathematical models for optimizing energy systems in general and those for find-
ing optimal solutions to a number of problems arising in studying electrical grids in
particular, as part of energy systems engineering, including models for studying the
functioning of these systems under uncertainty, have intensively been developed [16–
39]. There are numerous publications, including surveys, relating to various aspects
of the functioning of both the grid as a whole and its particular parts.
Though the present paper concerns a game-theoretic approach to studying particular
issues associated with electrical grids, the author believes that providing a brief review
of publications relating to the use of renewable sources of energy and storing systems
in electrical grids in this paper makes more sense than providing any detailed review
of applications of only game-theoretic approaches to studying electrical grids. The
reason for this choice of the review structure is dictated by the fact that game-theoretic
works with respect to electrical grids focus mostly on studying electricity spot markets
(where electricity is sold and bought) and on studying issues associated with investing
in the development of new power plants and systems for storing electricity [16–20].
For instance, a theoretical framework is offered in [16] for explaining two phenom-
ena in electricity markets: a) the excess of marginal costs by spot prices, and b) the
excess of spot prices by forward prices. The authors attempt to explain the coexis-
tence of pricemarkups and forward premiums in themarket by the presence of frequent
start-ups and shutdowns of the generators and ramping constraints (making the supply
curve dynamic), along with the dependence of regulating the power system on the
future production of the designated generators. A survey of approaches to designing
economic mechanisms of the electricity market functioning for markets with uniform
price auctions, pay-as-bid auctions, and the Vickrey auctions is presented in [17].
The survey suggests that a two-to three stage market in which both the day-ahead
market and the forward sales are run as either the Vickrey auctions or the uniform
price actions is preferable for all the market participants. The problem of reconcil-
ing the major “ideological” difference existing between two approaches to modeling
multi-bid electricity markets—a) the theoretical one that assumes that the companies
generating electricity provide piece-wise and differentiable supply functions, with a
specific amount that they would like to supply at each particular price, and b) the prac-
tical one in which the supply functions have the form of a ladder of steps—is studied
in [18]. Under the practical viewpoint, the market should be modeled as a discrete
unit auction, which causes the existence of only mixed-strategy equilibria in the bid-
ding game, whereas under the theoretical approach, an equilibrium in pure strategies
can be achieved. The authors propose sufficient conditions for the convergence of a
pure-strategy equilibrium in the game with particular stepped offer functions to the
equilibrium in the game with continuous ones.
A dynamic game is proposed to use in [19] for describing the competition of several
electricity producers each of which makes a decision on investing in new capacities
(or in new facilities) in a certain period of time in an attempt to maximize the expected
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utility under uncertainty. One of the uncertainties is associated with an unknown
demand for electricity (in a particular region), and another one deals with the fact that
producers with smaller volumes of production make their investment decisions only
after such decisions have been made by larger producers. In [20], the competition of
several producers ismodeled by a non-cooperative static game inwhich the uncertainty
is modeled by a tree of possible random events, taking into account the aging of the
existing generating facilities and the existence of two types of demand (a base demand
and a pick demand).
In the last several years, papers on using game-theoretic approaches to studying
various aspects of “smart” grid such as, for instance, energy consumption sched-
ules [21,22], demand-side management problems [23,24], including those in which
the presence of systems for storing electricity is taken into consideration [25], were
published. However, none of all the above publications deals with problems under
consideration in the present paper. It is for this reason, the author decided to provide
a brief review of a set of examples from three groups of typical publications on issues
more closely related to the subject of the present paper than those in the publications
[21–25] to let the reader form the impression on what concerns researchers in the field
the most.
The first group of the publications includes those dealing with configuring electrical
grids, including micro grids, as an electrical network, with estimating the perspectives
for the use of traditional and renewable sources of energy in the grid, andwith planning
the work of the grids. An approach to configuring large-scale electric power networks
such as a national electrical grid by simulating their functioning with the Plexos tool (a
tool for simulating financial markets) combined with the multi-objective optimization
evolutionary algorithm MOOEA (a heuristic stochastic software developed by the
authors) is proposed in [26]. Optimal management strategies for aMicro Grid—which
includes several sources of power and storage devices, and interacts with a grid under
such uncertainties as the load forecast, grid bid changes, and outputs of solar and
wind sources—are found in [27] by solving a nonlinear problem of minimizing the
total operational cost of the Micro Grid. An optimal proportion between the rate
of fossil-fuel generated energy and that generated by renewable sources of energy
is proposed to find by solving an optimal control problem in which a) the above
rates are decision variables whose dynamics is described by two nonlinear, first-order
differential equations, and b) the functional reflects the difference between the actual
power generation and the demand for this power for the planning period, the cost of
the control, and the gap between the targeted and the actual generation level of energy
[28]. A stochastic dynamic programming model in combination with Monte Carlo
simulations is used in [29] for planning the work of a generation company possessing
the Willingston Reservoir, an electricity storage with the capacity of 40,000 million
m3, for the five-to-six year time planning horizon with a discrete monthly time steps.
Linear programming is proposed for optimizing the integration of two electrical grids
into one, depending on the transmission capacity between them [30].
The second group of publications includes those related to storing electricity. The
state of the art of technologies for storing electricity obtained from the wind power
is reviewed in [31]. The review is done particularly, from the viewpoint of choosing
the sizes and the placement of storing systems in integrating them into utility grids to
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balance the benefits and the cost. Several mathematical models, including those for
optimizing the sizes of the storage systems that take into consideration the accuracy
of the wind power forecast, along with charging-discharging rules, and consider the
power deviation from the next hourly average as the cost function to be minimized,
are mentioned in that review. A review of the available electricity storage systems
and the problem of optimally sizing an energy storage system taking into account the
reliability requirements for isolated grids with wind power being the only source of
energy are considered in [32]. This problem is formulated as the one of minimizing
the annual capital and maintenance cost of the storage system under constraints of the
balance kind, and it is solved by means of sequential simulations with the use of a
generic algorithm. A review of recent advances and contemporary trends of storing
electricity technologies in Micro Grids (as electric power systems that may unite both
distributed energy resources, customers, and electricity storage systems capable of
functioning either separately from utility grids or as part of them) is presented in [33].
Both commercial and non-commercial models for calculating optimal sizes of the
electricity storages, along with corresponding software for simulation modeling, are
mentioned, and the authors’ viewpoint of their applicability to optimizing the size of
a Micro Grid is provided.
The third group of publications includes those considering particular parts of the
grid, including renewable sources of energy incorporated there. The functioning of
a power generating system within a grid with an energy storage system supplied by
wind power as a part of its back-up system in modeled in [34]. A two-stage stochastic
optimization problem in which the uncertainty of wind power (simulated by means
of the interval simulation technique to describe the wind power characteristics) is
formulated to optimize the total electricity demand in an electrical grid. A survey of
the use of mathematical modeling in the optimization of the power generation and
supply is presented in [35]. Among the models sited in the survey, there are stochastic
programming, robust stochastic programming, multi-objective optimization ones, and
equilibrium models that have become deployed in energy planning and managing
electricity supply networks. As shown in [36], in the framework of a power supply
and demand management in an islanded Micro Grid under uncertainties associated
with the power generation by renewable sources of energy, the Micro Grid central
controller can solve a problem with a convex goal function and a nonlinear system
of constraints to minimize the energy cost in determining an optimal consumption
and generation of power. Results of a simulation modeling of two scenarios of the
forecasted development of the electricity market in India for 2017 under the expected
growth of using the renewable sources of energy (called High and Low Renewable
scenarios) are presented in [37]. These results are used by the authors to offer their
viewpoint on several issues, including the impact of the operating costs for renewable
sources of energy on the total cost of the energy generation, on the transmission system,
etc. A brief review of numerous simple mathematical models describing physical
and chemical principles of functioning for various renewable sources of energy such
as wind energy systems, Micro Hydro Power systems, solar photovoltaic systems,
biogas, and biomass gasifier systems are presented in [38]. Besides these models
a) mathematical descriptions of various economic criteria in optimization problems
related to unit sizing of the integrated renewable energy systems and cost optimization
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in these systems, b) citations to scientific publications in which these optimization
problems are considered, and c) brief, one-sentence descriptions of the essence of these
publications (as the authors see it) are provided in [38]. The sited publications study, in
particular, artificial intelligence approaches, multi-objective approaches, developing
iterative algorithms, simulation, and probabilistic approaches, as well as available
software utilizing these approaches.
Since every electricity storage system can formally be viewed as an inventory
system, one may question whether the well-developed theory of inventory systems—
especially of those with the so-called power demand [39], which may allow one to
determine the size of the storing system—should or can be used in modeling the
functioning of a regional electrical grid. However, one should bear in mind that the
replenishment patterns in electricity storages are difficult to describe other than those
randomly formed, so as an inventory system, an electricity storage system has both a
random demand and a random replenishment. In the present paper, an attempt to deter-
mine the demand patterns and the replenishment strategy is undertaken (with respect
to electricity storage systems) in the framework of finding an optimal configuration
of a regional electrical grid, and these patterns can further be used for developing any
detailed models for electricity storage systems as such, including those considering
these systems as inventory ones.
All the models cited in the above and problems formulated on their basis focus
mostly on the optimal use of particular technologies, facilities, and devices being
part of the grid, including those for storing electricity. As far as the author is aware,
a game-theoretic approach has never been used for analyzing the potential of the
current suppliers for electrical grids with particular configurations to compete with
other suppliers of electricity (from renewable sources of energy). Nor has it been used
for finding directions and the scale of possible reconfigurations of the grids, especially
on account of incorporating renewable sources of energy and storing systems in them.
To a certain extent, this state of affairs may reflect two phenomena:
a) the current dominance of one of the above two viewpoints on how to operate base
load power plants, that is, to “tune them on the wholesale and retail markets” in
which electricity is sold and bought, rather than to “match” them with prospective
customers under long-term contractual agreements, and
b) considerable difficulties of modeling the grids as large-scale systems in forms
properly reflecting basic technological and possible business relations among all
its elementswhile allowing one to solve optimization problems formulatedwith the
use of these models by available techniques and software with a needed accuracy
and in an acceptable time.
The author believes that the approach to studying electrical grids in the framework
of particular classes of games with many (more than three) players, proposed in this
paper, is novel and has several helpful features. First, it allows all interested parties—
large grid customers, generating facilities, and the transmission companies—to choose
their business strategies while taking into account rapid developments of renewable
sources of energy and electricity storing systems and their growing accessibility for
both households and neighborhoods. Second, it allows one to have a different look
at the electricity markets and better evaluate their structure and dynamics. Third,
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games on polyhedral sets of player strategies, underlying the proposed approach,
allow both the grid customers and electricity producers effectively calculate their Nash
equilibrium strategies to estimate long-term policies to pursue in determining possible
configurations and vital parameters of the grids. Fourth, this approach demonstrates
the power of linear programming techniques—possessing enormous computational
potential—in solving n-person games on polyhedral sets of player strategies in general
and in analyzing large-scale economic problems in the energy sector associated with
producing and supplying electricity in particular.
Though the presented paper concerns a practical problem, it is purely theoretical,
since its goal is to demonstrate the power of optimization techniques in developing
tools for analyzing practical large-scale economic problems, particularly those asso-
ciated with producing and supplying electricity in a region. Any model examples of
using these tools would demonstrate no more than how a particular piece of software
implementing the tools really functions, which may present interest mostly from the
viewpoint of transforming the tools into a research or a commercial instrument for
studying electrical grids in principle and for estimating the quality of their implemen-
tation in particular. Also, one should bear in mind that collecting the real data for the
presented game model is not an easy task, especially taking into account that most
of the data has commercial value and may not be available other than for particular
businesses.
2 The problem statement and basic assumptions
Let us consider a regional electrical grid which includes [15]
a) a company (or a group of companies acting as one legal entity) which is (is consid-
ered as) a base load power plant, producing and selling electricity to the customers
of the grid (the generator further in this paper),
b) a company (or a group of companies acting as one legal entity) offering services
associated with transmitting electric energy via (high voltage) transmission lines
(the transmission company),
c) companies providing electricity for individual end users in industrial and residen-
tial areas via (low voltage) distribution lines (the utility companies),
d) industrial enterprizes and large businesses that receive electricity from the gener-
ator under direct supply agreements (the industrial customers),
e) groups of end users that are licensed to operate the (low voltage) distribution lines
via which electricity is delivered to them directly, rather than via utility companies
(the groups of advanced customers, in particular, micro grids),
f) individual end users that can receive electricity via the above utility companies
only (the households), and
g) a company (or a group of companies acting as one legal entity) which is (is con-
sidered as) a peaking power plant producing and selling electricity to all the above
customers when the actual electricity demand of the customers in the grid (to be
covered by the other sources of electricity in the grid) at a particular moment
exceeds the expected one (the peaking power facility (or plant) further in this
paper).
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Assumption 1 Under the regulation and deregulation measures that are in force in the
country, each industrial customer, each utility company, and each group of advanced
customers have access to a fleet of equipment to store electricity up to a needed
volume. Also, each of these customers of the grid has access to a fleet of equipment
for transforming solar andwind energy into electric energy,which is a property of some
legal entities (the suppliers further in this paper) and can provide the needed volume
of electricity to the customers. No grid customer may resell (either via a wholesale
electricity market or via a retial electricity market) excessive volumes of electricity
that may eventually be in its possession (beyond volumes that the customer decides to
store) though each customer can return electricity received from the suppliers to these
suppliers at no cost to the suppliers.
Assumption 2 In the framework of the grid, no base load power plants other than
those being part of the generator, no peaking power plants other than those being part
of the peaking power facility, and no other transmission enterprizes other than the
transmission company compete for the customers of the regional grid. Any demand
for electricity that exceeds the baseload production of the generator that cannot be
covered by any available sources of electricity other than by peaking power plants is
to be covered by the peaking power facility.
It is important to emphasize the difference between two logically possible
approaches to understanding the interaction of all electricity consumers and the gen-
erator in a regional electrical grid. In the framework of the first approach, all the
consumers attempt to meet their electricity demands from the base load power plants
that comprise the generator and from renewable sources of energy (directly or with
the deployment of electricity storage facilities available to them in both cases). They
use electricity produced by the peaking power facility only when the actual electricity
demand exceeds the expected one and cannot be covered by any other manner. In con-
trast, under the second approach, the peaking power facility is considered a part of the
generator. The major reason not to consider peaking power plants as base load power
plants is associated with much higher prices per unit volume of electricity produced by
peaking power plants, compared to those for electricity produced by base load power
plants (most of which are either nuclear or coal-operated facilities).
Assumption 3 The following information is known:
a) a minimum and amaximum average hourly electricity demands for each industrial
customer for every twenty-four-hour period of time,
b) a minimum and a maximum aggregate hourly electricity demands for each utility
company and for each group of advanced customers (which are based on such
estimates for individual end users (the households) in both cases) for every 24h,
c) a maximum capacity of the generator for producing electricity, along with the
volume of losses in transmitting a unit volume of electricity via transmission lines
to each category of customers within the grid,
d) the costs of (the expenses associated with) operating the equipment for transform-
ing solar and wind energy into a unit volume of electric energy, and
e) the costs of (the expenses associated with) operating the equipment for storing
electricity per unit volume.
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One needs to determine
• an optimal (constant) hourly baseload production volume for each base load power
plant being part of the generator,
• optimal prices for a unit volume of the electricity produced by the generator for
each group of customers within the grid on an hourly basis,
• optimal prices for transmitting a unit volume of electricity from the generator to
each customer that receives electricity from the generator directly, and
• the scale of incorporating in the grid facilities for storing electricity for each cat-
egory of customers within the grid, along with that of incorporating facilities for
transforming solar and wind energy into electricity, under both the existing and
any expected prices for electricity that can be supplied by these facilities.
Let [40]
m be the number of industrial customers within the grid,
n be the number of utility companies that have access to the (low voltage) distrib-
ution lines via which individual end users of the grid receive electricity,
r be the number of groups of advanced customers that have licences to operate the
existing (low voltage) distribution lines directly, rather than via utility companies,
Y g(l) be the volume of electric energy produced by the generator in the period of
time from hour l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
ygi (l) be the volume of electric energy produced by the generator that is bought
by industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l,
l ∈ 1, 24,
zgj (l) be the volume of electric energy produced by the generator that is bought by
utility company j, j ∈ 1, n in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
ugk (l) be the volume of electric energy produced by the generator that is bought by
group of advanced customers k, k ∈ 1, r in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour
l, l ∈ 1, 24.
Assumption 4 [15] The loss of power in transmitting electricity to all the above large
customers for the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l within a certain “working
segment” of power produced by the generator can be described by a piece-wise linear
function of the volume of electricity produced by the generator
max
λl∈1,l
(
aλl + bλl Y g(l)
)
, l ∈ 1, 24,
where aλl +bλl Y g(l) are linear functions of the variablesY g(l), λl ∈ 1,l , aλl , bλl ∈
R1, l ∈ 1, 24.
This assumption allows one to describe the volume of the electric energy that is to be
produced by the generator during the period of time fromhour l−1 to hour l (to provide
the customers with the above volumes of electricity ygi (l), i ∈ 1,m, zgj (l), j ∈ 1, n,
and ugk (l), k ∈ 1, r , l ∈ 1, 24) as follows:
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Y g(l) =
⎛
⎝
m∑
i=1
ygi (l) +
n∑
j=1
zgj (l) +
r∑
k=1
ugk (l)
⎞
⎠ + max
λl∈1,l
(
aλl + bλl Y g(l)
)
,
l ∈ 1, 24, (1)
Remark 1 As is well known, the power loss in transmitting power in an electrical
grid from a generating facility to a customer is formed by several ingredients, and
the loss in high voltage transmission lines is the major one. According to Ohm’s law,
the power loss in a particular transmission line is proportional to the square of the
power transmitted (provided the transmission voltage is kept constant), and the pro-
portionality coefficient depends on the length of the transmission line (along which
the power travels), the diameter of the conductor, the properties of the conductor mate-
rial (resistance) that is used in the transmission line, and the value of the above high
transmission voltage. Since the production of each base load power plant is to be
set at a particular volume (and, as mentioned earlier, finding its optimal production
is one of the aims of developing the mathematical model under consideration in the
present paper), one can consider a) a certain segment of production volumes contain-
ing the above particular production volume, say, [cmin, cmax ] and b) the functions
maxλl∈1,l
(
aλl + bλl Y g(l)
)
as piece-wise approximations of the convex functions
fl : R1 → R1, fl(Y g(l)) = (Y g(l))2/k, l ∈ 1, 24 on the segment [cmin, cmax ],
where k >> 1, and 1/k equals the loss of power in transmitting a unit of electric
power volume via the transmission line of the transmission company. The functions
fl , l ∈ 1, 24 describe the loss of power in the transmission line associated with
transmitting electric energy from the generator to the grid customers (under the above
assumption on the transmission voltage in the high voltage transmission lines) in the
period of time from hour l−1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24. It is clear that such an approximation
can be done with any accuracy.
Let
pyi (l) be the price at which a unit volume of electric energy is sold by the generator
to industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l,
l ∈ 1, 24,
pzj (l) be the price at which a unit volume of electric energy is sold by the generator
to utility company j, j ∈ 1, n, in the period of time from hour l−1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
puk (l) be the price at which a unit volume of electric energy is sold by the generator
to group of advanced customers k, k ∈ 1, r in the period of time from hour l − 1 to
hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
yg = (yg1 (1), . . . , yg1 (24); yg2 (1), . . . , yg2 (24); . . . ; ygm(1), . . . , ygm(24)
)
be the
vector whose component ygi (l) is the volume of electric energy that is bought by
industrial customer i from the generator in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour
l, i ∈ 1,m, l ∈ 1, 24,
py = (py1 (1), . . . , py1 (24); py2 (1), . . . , py2 (24); . . . ; pym(1), . . . , pym(24)
)
be the
vector whose component pyi (l) is the price at which a unit volume of electric energy
is sold to industrial customer i by the generator in the period of time from hour l − 1
to hour l, i ∈ 1,m, l ∈ 1, 24,
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zg = (zg1(1), . . . , zg1(24); zg2(1), . . . , zg2(24); . . . ; zgn(1), . . . , zgn(24)
)
be the vector
whose component zgj (l) is the volume of electric energy that is bought by utility
company j from the generator in the period of time from hour l−1 to hour l, j ∈ 1, n,
l ∈ 1, 24,
pz = (pz1(1), . . . , pz1(24); pz2(1), . . . , pz2(24); . . . ; pzn(1), . . . , pzn(24)
)
be the vec-
tor whose component pzj (l) is the price at which a unit volume of electric energy is
sold to utility company j by the generator in the period of time from hour l − 1 to
hour l, j ∈ 1, n, l ∈ 1, 24,
ug = (ug1(1), . . . , ug1(24); ug2(1), . . . , ug2(24); . . . ; ugr (1), . . . , ugr (24)
)
be the vec-
tor whose component ugk (l) is the volume of electric energy that is bought by group
of advanced customers k from the generator in the period of time from hour l − 1 to
hour l, k ∈ 1, r , l ∈ 1, 24,
pu = (pu1 (1), . . . , pu1 (24); pu2 (1), . . . , pu2 (24); . . . ; pur (1), . . . , pur (24)
)
be the
vector whose component puk (l) is the price at which a unit volume of electric energy
is sold to group of advanced customers k by the generator in the period of time from
hour l − 1 to hour l, k ∈ 1, r , l ∈ 1, 24.
Assumption 5 The generator can sell electric energy at any (competitive) prices as long
as these prices donot violate the consumer rights of the grid customers.Moreover, these
prices can be different for different categories of the customers at any particular period
of time, and the prices for each customer from the above three groups of customers
within the grid can be different in different periods of time within any 24h. All the
energy sold by the generator as a whole is that consumed (bought) by the customers
within the grid.
Remark 2 If the generator is comprised of several generating facilities, one can easily
determine a baseload supply of electricity for each of these facilities (that secure the
optimal supply of electricity by the generator as awhole) by introducing corresponding
relations of the balance type into themathematical descriptionof the set of the generator
strategies (these relations are presented in Concluding Remark 1).
Assumption 6 Thebaseload supply of the generator is soughtwithin a certain “working
segment” of the electricity production volumes, and within the segment, expenses of
the generator associated with producing electric energy can be described by a piece-
wise linear function.
Remark 3 Certainly, the description of the generator expenses associated with pro-
ducing electric energy as functions of the production volumes in the form of a piece-
wise linear function is a simplification of the grid regularities, since, generally, these
expenses are suggested to be described by non-decreasing convex functions for each
base load power plant [41].
However, the reasoning presented in Remark 1 regarding a piece-wise approxima-
tion of the functions fl (at least within the above “working segment” of the electric-
ity production volumes for the generator, mentioned in Assumption 6) is applicable
in choosing a particular form of a formalized description of the generator expenses
associated with the electricity production. So in the reasoning to follow, the genera-
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tor expenses associated with producing electricity are considered to be described by
piece-wise linear functions in the form
max
μl∈1,l
(
cμl + bμl Y g(l)
)
, l ∈ 1, 24,
where cμl + dμl Y g(l) are linear functions of the variables Y g(l), cμl , bμl ∈ R1, l ∈
1, 24 (within the above segment of the production volume [cmin, cmax ]).
Assumption 7 The transmission company charges both the generator and each of the
(three) groups of large grid customers for transmitting a unit volume of electricity. The
transmission prices are constant for both the generator and for the customers during the
24h period of time though they can be different for different customers. The capacity
of the transmission lines is considered to be sufficient to meet the estimated maximum
demands of all the grid customers that use these lines for receiving electricity bought
from the generator.
3 The mathematical formulation of the problem
Let us first consider mathematical models describing the functioning of the grid ele-
ments.
Industrial customers
Let
ydemi (l) be the electricity demand of industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m in the period
of time from hour l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
ydemi (l) be the estimate of the maximal electricity demand of industrial customer
i, i ∈ 1,m in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
ydem
i
(l) be the estimate of the minimal electricity demand of industrial customer
i, i ∈ 1,m in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
ywi (l) be the volume of electric energy that is received by industrial customer
i, i ∈ 1,m from wind energy in the period of time from hour l −1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
yw−sti (l) be the part of the volume of electric energy that is received by industrial
customer i, i ∈ 1,m from wind energy and that goes to the storage system of this
customer in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
yw−diri (l) be the part of the volume of electric energy that is received by industrial
customer i, i ∈ 1,m from wind energy and that is used by this customer directly,
beginning from the moment of receiving this energy in the period of time from hour
l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
ysi (l) be the volume of electric energy that is received by industrial customer i, i ∈
1,m from solar energy in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
ys−sti (l) be the part of the volume of electric energy that is received by industrial
customer i, i ∈ 1,m from solar energy and that goes to the storage system of this
customer in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
ys−diri (l) be the part of the volume of electric energy that is received by industrial
customer i, i ∈ 1,m from solar energy and that is used by this customer directly,
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beginning from the moment of receiving this energy in the period of time from hour
l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
ygi (l) be the volume of electric energy that is received by industrial customer i, i ∈
1,m from the generator, in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
yg−sti (l) be the part of the volume of electric energy that is received by industrial
customer i, i ∈ 1,m from the generator and that goes to the storage system of this
customer in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
yg−diri (l) be the part of the volume of electric energywhich is received by industrial
customer i, i ∈ 1,m from the generator and that is used by this customer directly,
beginning from the moment of receiving this energy in the period of time from hour
l − 1 to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
ysti (l) be the volume of electric energy that is available to industrial customer
i, i ∈ 1,m from its storage system in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l,
l ∈ 1, 24,
ydem−sti (l) be the volume of electric energy that is consumed by industrial customer
i, i ∈ 1,m from its storage system in the period of time from hour l − 1 to hour l,
l ∈ 1, 24,
ysti (0) be the volume of electric energy that is present in the storage system of
industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m at the beginning of the 24h period of time,
yst
+
i be the maximum volume of electric energy that can be stored in the storage
system of industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m,
yst
i
be the minimal hourly volume of electric energy that is to be present in the
storage system of industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m,
yi be the volume of (average hourly) energy loss associated with storing electricity
in the storage system of industrial customer i, 0 < yi < 1, i ∈ 1,m,
λ
yw
i be the (average hourly) expenses of industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m that are
associated with receiving a unit volume of electric energy from wind energy,
λ
ys
i be the (average hourly) expenses of industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m that are
associated with receiving a unit volume of electric energy from solar energy, and
π
y
i be the (average hourly) expenses of industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m that are
associated with operating its storage system per unit volume of electricity available to
this customer.
The functioning of the storage facility of industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m can be
described by the following model of the balance kind:
ysti (l) = ysti (0)+
l∑
x=1
(
yg−sti (x) + ys−sti (x) + yw−sti (x)
)−
l∑
x=1
(ydem−sti (x) + yi x),
ysti ≤ ysti (l) ≤ yst
+
i , l ∈ 1, 24.
Further, let
yw
i
(l) be the estimate of the minimal volume of electricity produced from wind
energy that industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m agrees to receive from the supplier, l ∈
1, 24, and
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ys
i
(l) be the estimate of the minimal volume of electricity produced from solar
energy that industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m agrees to receive from the supplier, l ∈
1, 24.
Then the functioning of industrial customer i, i ∈ 1, n (from the viewpoint of
receiving and consuming electric energy) can be described by the following mathe-
matical model:
yw
i
(l) ≤ ywi (l),
ys
i
(l) ≤ ysi (l),
ydem
i
(l) ≤ ydemi (l) ≤ ydemi (l),
ysti (l) = ysti (0) +
l∑
x=1
(
yg−sti (x) + ys−sti (x) + yw−sti (x)
)
−
l∑
x=1
(ydem−sti (x) + yi x),
yst
i
≤ ysti (l) ≤ yst
+
i ,
ydemi (l) = yw−diri (l) + ys−diri (l) + yg−diri (l) + ydem−sti (l),
ywi (l) = yw−diri (l) + yw−sti (l),
ysi (l) = ys−diri (l) + ys−sti (l),
ygi (l) = yg−diri (l) + yg−sti (l),
i ∈ 1,m, l ∈ 1, 24. (2)
Here, it is assumed that system (2) is compatible, which can be verified by a simple
technique, proposed in [42].
Let
ygi =
(
ygi (1), . . . , y
g
i (24)
); ywi =
(
ywi (1), . . . , y
w
i (24)
); ysi =
(
ysi (1), . . . , y
s
i (24)
);
pyi =
(
pyi (1), . . . , p
y
i (24)
); λywi (av) = (λywi , . . . , λywi ), λysi (av)= (λysi , . . . , λysi );
ysti = (ysti (1), . . . , ysti (24)), λywi (av), λysi (av) ∈ R24+ , i ∈ 1,m,
so that yg = (yg1 , yg2 , . . . , ygm), py = (py1 , py2 , . . . , pym), and let
y˜ =
(
yg; yw1 , yw2 , . . . , ywm ; ys1, ys2, . . . , ysm; yst1 , yst2 , . . . , ystm
)
,
p˜y = (py; 0, 0 . . . , 0; 0, 0 . . . , 0; 0, 0 . . . , 0),
q˜ y =
(
0; λyw1 (av), . . . , λywm (av); λys1 (av), . . . , λysm (av);π y1 , . . . , π ym
)
,
so that 〈yg, py〉 = 〈y˜, p˜y〉. Finally, let syi be the hourly price that industrial customer i
pays the transmission company for a unit volume of electric energy transmitted to this
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customer during the 24h period of time, i ∈ 1,m, and let ˜ y = ( y, . . . ,  y; 0 . . . , 0),
where ˜ y is the vector of the same dimension as y˜ with all non-zero components
equalling 1, where  y ∈ R24+ is the vector with all the components equalling 1.
Then the goal function of industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m can be written as
24∑
l=1
(
ygi (l)p
y
i (l) + ywi (l)λywi (av) + ysi (l)λysi (av) + ygi (l)syi + ysti (l)π yi
)
= 〈 p˜y, y˜〉i +
〈
˜ y, y˜
〉
i s
y
i +
〈
q˜ y, y˜
〉
i → min(y˜)i , i ∈ 1,m, (3)
where 〈y˜, p˜y〉i means a part of the scalar product of the vectors y˜, and p˜y relating to
industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m, and 〈˜ y, y˜〉i , 〈q˜ y, y˜〉i have the similar meaning with
respect to transmitting electricity to industrial customer i and to the electric energy
received by industrial customer i from the wind, solar, and storage systems available
to this customer.
Utility companies
The functioning of utility company j, j ∈ 1, n can be described by a similar system
of constraints binding the variables and parameters
zwj (l), z
w−st
j (l), z
w−dir
j (l), z
s
j (l), z
s−st
j (l), z
s−dir
j (l),
zgj (l), z
g−dir
j (l), z
g−st
j (l), z
st
j (l),
zdem−stj (l), z
st
j (0), z
st
j , z
st+
j , zj , λzwj , λzsj ,
π zj , z
dem
j (l), z
dem
j (l), z
dem
j (l), z
w
j (l), z
s
j (l), j ∈ 1, n, l ∈ 1, 24,
that have the same meaning that do the (corresponding to them) variables and para-
meters that are used for describing the functioning of industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m.
A detailed description of all these variables, along with that of the functioning of the
storage facilities that utility company j uses, is presented in [15].
Let
zgj =
(
zgj (1), . . . , z
g
j (24)
); zwj =
(
zwj (1), . . . , z
w
j (24)
); zsj =
(
zsj (1), . . . , z
s
j (24)
);
pzj =
(
pzj (1), . . . , p
z
j (24)
); λzwj (av) = (λzwj , . . . , λzwj ), λzsj (av) = (λzsj , . . . , λzsj );
zstj = (zstj (1), . . . , zstj (24)), λzwj (av), λzsj (av) ∈ R24+ , j ∈ 1, n, (4)
so that zg = (zg1 , zg2 , . . . , zgn), pz = (pz1, pz2, . . . , pzn), and let
z˜ =
(
zg; zw1 , zw2 , . . . , zwn ; zs1, zs2, . . . , zsn; zst1 , zst2 , . . . , zstn
)
,
p˜z = (pz; 0, 0 . . . , 0; 0, 0 . . . , 0; 0, 0 . . . , 0),
q˜ z =
(
0; λzw1 (av), . . . , λzwn (av); λzs1 (av), . . . , λzsn (av);π z1 , . . . , π zn
)
,
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so that 〈zg, pz〉 = 〈z˜, p˜z〉 , where the sense of all the components of the vectors
z˜, p˜z, zg, pz, is completely identical to that of the corresponding components of the
vectors y˜, p˜y, yg, py , respectively, and the corresponding components of the vectors
from (4) satisfy the system of constraints that is completely identical to system (2)
and is assumed to be compatible. Here, π zj , j ∈ 1, n have the meaning similar to that
of π yi , i ∈ 1,m.
Finally, let szj be the hourly price that utility company j pays the transmission
company for a unit volume of electric energy transmitted to this untility company j
during the 24h period of time, and let ˜z = (z, . . . , z; 0 . . . , 0), where ˜z is the
vector of the same dimension as z˜ with all non-zero components equalling 1, where
z ∈ R24+ is the vector with all the components equalling 1.
With the use of this notation, the goal function of utility company j, j ∈ 1, n can
be written as
24∑
l=1
(
zgj (l)p
z
j (l) + zwj (l)λzwj (av) + zsj (l)λzsj (av) + zgj (l)szj + zstj (l)π zj
)
= 〈 p˜z, z˜〉 j +
〈
˜z, z˜
〉
j s
z
j +
〈
q˜ z, z˜
〉
j → min(z˜) j , j ∈ 1, n. (5)
Groups of advanced customers
The functioning of group of advanced customers k, k ∈ 1, r can be described by a
system of constraints binding the variables and parameters
uwk (l), u
w−st
k (l), u
w−dir
k (l), u
s
k(l), u
s−st
k (l), u
s−dir
k (l),
ugk (l), u
g−dir
k (l), u
g−st
k (l), u
st
k (l)
udem−stk (l), u
st
k (0), u
st
k , u
st+
k , uk , λuwk , λusk ,
πuk , u
dem
k (l), u
dem
k (l), u
dem
k (l), u
w
k (l), u
s
k(l), k ∈ 1, r , l ∈ 1, 24,
that have the same meaning that do the (corresponding to them) variables and para-
meters that are used for describing the functioning of industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m.
A detailed description of all these variables, along with that of the functioning of the
storage facilities that group of advanced customers k uses, is presented in [15].
Let
ugk =
(
ugk (1), . . . , u
g
k (24)
); uwk =
(
uwk (1), . . . , u
w
k (24)
); usk =
(
usk(1), . . . , u
s
k(24)
);
puk =
(
puk (1), . . . , p
u
k (24)
); λuwk (av) = (λuwk , . . . , λuwk ), λusk (av)= (λusk , . . . , λusk );
ustk = (ustk (1), . . . , ustk (24)), λuwk (av), λusk (av) ∈ R24+ , k ∈ 1, r , (6)
so that ug = (ug1, ug2, . . . , ugr ), pu = (pu1 , pu2 , . . . , pur ), and let
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u˜ =
(
ug; uw1 , uw2 , . . . , uwr ; us1, us2, . . . , usr ; ust1 , ust2 , . . . , ustr
)
,
p˜u = (pu; 0, 0 . . . , 0; 0, 0 . . . , 0; 0, 0 . . . , 0),
q˜u =
(
0; λuw1 (av), . . . , λuwr (av); λus1 (av), . . . , λusr (av);πu1 , . . . , πur
)
,
so that 〈ug, pu〉 = 〈u˜, p˜u〉 , where the sense of the components of the vectors
u˜, p˜u, ug, pu is completely identical to that of the corresponding components of the
vectors y˜, p˜y, yg, py , respectively, and the corresponding components of the vectors
from (6) satisfy the system of constraints that is completely identical to system (2)
and is assumed to be compatible. Here, πuk , k ∈ 1, r have the same meaning that do
π
y
i , i ∈ 1,m and π zj , j ∈ 1, n.
Finally, let suk be the hourly price that group of advanced customers k pays the
transmission company for a unit volume of electric energy transmitted to this group of
advanced customers during the 24h period of time, and let ˜u = (u, . . . , u; 0 . . . , 0),
where ˜u is the vector of the same dimension as u˜ with all non-zero components
equalling 1, where u ∈ R24+ is the vector with all the components equalling 1.
With the use of this notation, the goal function of group of advanced customers
k, k ∈ 1, r can be written as follows:
24∑
l=1
(
ugk (l)p
u
k (l) + uwk (l)λuwk (av) + usk(l)λusk (av) + ugk (l)suk + ustk (l)πuk
)
= 〈 p˜u, u˜〉k +
〈
˜u, u˜
〉
k s
u
k +
〈
q˜u, u˜
〉
k → min
(u˜)k
, k ∈ 1, r . (7)
The transmission company
Let
θ y be the vector whose component θ yi is the hourly price for a unit volume of
electric energy that the transmission company charges the generator for the use of the
transmission lines to transmit electricity to industrial customer i, i ∈ 1,m, and it is
assumed that this price remains the same for the generator during 24h,
θ z be the vector whose component θ zj is the hourly price for a unit volume of
electric energy that the transmission company charges the generator for the use of
the transmission lines to transmit electricity to utility company j, j ∈ 1, n, and it is
assumed that this price remains the same for this utility company during 24h,
θu be the vector whose component θuk is the hourly price for a unit volume of
electric energy that the transmission company charges the generator for the use of the
transmission lines to transmit electricity to group of advanced customers k, k ∈ 1, r ,
and it is assumed that this price remains the same for this group of advanced customers
during 24h,
θ be the price for a unit volume of the electric energy lost in transmitting electricity
to the grid customers via the (high voltage) transmission line that the transmission
company charges the generator, and it is assumed that this price is known and remains
the same during 24h,
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s˜ y be the vector whose component syi is the hourly price which industrial customer
i as a customer of the grid pays the transmission company for a unit volume of electric
energy transmitted to this customer, i ∈ 1,m, and it is assumed that this price remains
the same for this industrial customer during 24h,
s˜z be the vector whose component szj is the hourly price which utility company j
as a customer of the grid pays the transmission company for a unit volume of electric
energy transmitted to this utility company, j ∈ 1, n, and it is assumed that this price
remains the same for this utility company during 24h,
s˜u be the vector whose component suk is the hourly price which group of advanced
customers k as a customer of the grid pays the transmission company for a unit volume
of electric energy transmitted to this group of advanced customers, k ∈ 1, r , and it is
assumed that this price remains the same for group of advanced customers k during
24h.
Taking into account Assumption 4, the goal function of the transmission company
can be described as a bilinear function of the vector variables y˜, z˜, u˜, and components
of the vector variables θ y, θ z, θu, s˜ y, s˜ z, s˜u
( m∑
i=1
〈
˜ y, y˜
〉
iθ
y
i +
n∑
j=1
〈
˜z, z˜
〉
jθ
z
j +
r∑
k=1
〈
˜u, u˜
〉
kθ
u
k
)
+ θ
24∑
l=1
max
λl∈1,l
(
aλl + bλl Y g(l)
)
+
( m∑
i=1
〈
˜ y, y˜
〉
i s
y
i +
n∑
j=1
〈
˜z, z˜
〉
j s
z
j +
r∑
k=1
〈
˜u, u˜
〉
ks
u
k
)
→ max
(θ y , θ z , θu , s˜ y ,s˜z ,s˜u)
.
(8)
The generator
Using the notation from the previous section, one can easily conclude that the total
revenue of the generator can be described by the bilinear function 〈py, yg〉+〈pz, zg〉+
〈pu, ug〉 of the vector variables yg, zg, ug and py, pz, pu . Then the functioning of the
generator within 24h (from the viewpoint of producing and selling electric energy
to the grid customers) can be described by the following mathematical model of the
balance kind:
〈
,Y g
〉 −
( 〈
 y, yg
〉 + 〈z, zg 〉 + 〈u, ug 〉
)
− 〈, MAXloss(Y g)
〉 = 0,
Hmin ≤
〈
,Y g
〉 ≤ Hmax ,
ζ(yg, zg, ug, py, pz, pu) = 〈yg, py 〉 + 〈zg, pz 〉 + 〈ug, pu 〉 − 〈, MAXexpen(Y g)
〉
−	(Y g, yg, zg, ug)), (9)
where Y g = (Y g(1), . . . ,Y g(24)), ,  y, z, u are vectors of corresponding dimen-
sions whose all components equal 1, Hmin and Hmax are the minimal and the maximal
technologically possible production capacities of the generator within 24h, respec-
tively, and the function in the last equation describes the generator’s profit within 24 h.
123
408 A.S. Belenky
MAXloss(Y
g) =
(
max
λ1∈1,1
(aλ1 + bλ1Y g(1)), . . . , max
λ24∈1,24
(aλ24 + bλ24Y g(24))
)
,
MAXexpen(Y
g) =
(
max
μ1∈1,1
(cμ1 + dμ1Y g(1)), . . . , max
μ24∈1,24
(cμ24 + dμ24Y g(24))
)
,
the function	(Y g, yg, zg, ug) is the function describing the generator expenses asso-
ciated with transmitting electric energy to the grid customers, which can be written in
the form
	(Y g, yg, zg, ug) = 	(Y g, y˜, z˜, u˜)) = θ
24∑
l=1
max
λl∈1,l
(
alλl + blλl Y g(l)
)
+
( m∑
i=1
〈
˜ y, y˜
〉
iθ
y
i +
n∑
j=1
〈
˜z, z˜
〉
jθ
z
j +
r∑
k=1
〈
˜u, u˜
〉
kθ
u
k
)
. (10)
The goal function of the generator can be written as
ζ(yg, zg, ug, py, pz, pu) =
m∑
i=1
〈
y˜, p˜y
〉
i +
n∑
j=1
〈
z˜, p˜z
〉
j +
r∑
k=1
〈
u˜, p˜u
〉
k
−
24∑
l=1
max
μl∈1,l
(
cμl + dμl Y g(l)
)
− θ
24∑
l=1
max
λl∈1,l
(
aλl + bλl Y g(l)
)
−
( m∑
i=1
〈
˜ y, y˜
〉
iθ
y
i +
n∑
j=1
〈
˜z, z˜
〉
jθ
z
j +
r∑
k=1
〈
˜u, u˜
〉
kθ
u
k
)
→ max
( p˜y , p˜z , p˜u),
(11)
where the inequalities for the prices py ≤ pˆy, pz ≤ pˆz, pu ≤ pˆu, in which the vectors
pˆy, pˆz, pˆu reflect the current status of the electricity market, hold.
The game model of the interaction of the grid elements
Let us now consider the interaction of the generator with all the above large grid
customers that receive electric energy from the generator, as well as from the available
renewable sources of energy (directly and via electricity storing facilities), and with
the transmission company. This interaction can be viewed as a (m+n+r +2)-person
game with the payoff functions described by (3), (5), (7), (8), and (11) [15]
m∑
i=1
〈
p˜y , y˜
〉
i +
n∑
j=1
〈
p˜z, z˜
〉
j +
r∑
k=1
〈
p˜u , u˜
〉
k − θ
24∑
l=1
max
λl∈1,l
(
aλl + bλl Y g(l)
)
−
24∑
l=1
max
μl∈1,l
(
cμl + dμl Y g(l)
)
−
( m∑
i=1
〈
˜y, y˜
〉
i θ
y
i +
n∑
j=1
〈
˜z, z˜
〉
j θ
z
j +
r∑
k=1
〈
˜u , u˜
〉
kθ
u
k
)
→ max
( p˜y , p˜z , p˜u)
,
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( m∑
i=1
〈
˜y , y˜
〉
i θ
y
i +
n∑
j=1
〈
˜z, z˜
〉
j θ
z
j +
r∑
k=1
〈
˜u , u˜
〉
kθ
u
k
)
+ θ
24∑
l=1
max
λl∈1,l
(
aλl + bλl Y g(l)
)
+
( m∑
i=1
〈
˜y, y˜
〉
i s
y
i +
n∑
j=1
〈
˜z, z˜
〉
j s
z
j +
r∑
k=1
〈
˜u , u˜
〉
ks
u
k
)
→ max
(θ y , θ z , θu , s˜ y ,s˜z ,s˜u)
,
〈
p˜y , y˜
〉
i +
〈
˜y , y˜
〉
i s˜
y
i +
〈
q˜ y , y˜
〉
i → min
(y˜)i
, i ∈ 1,m,
〈
p˜z, z˜
〉
j +
〈
˜z, z˜
〉
j s˜
z
j +
〈
q˜ z, z˜
〉
j → min
(z˜) j
, j ∈ 1, n,
〈
p˜u , u˜
〉
k +
〈
˜u , u˜
〉
k s˜
u
k +
〈
q˜u , u˜
〉
k → min
(u˜)k
, k ∈ 1, r ,
(y˜, z˜, u˜, Y g) ∈ 
, ( p˜y , p˜z, p˜u) ∈ M, (θ y1 , . . . , θ ym , θ z1 , . . . , θ zn , θu1 , . . . , θur ) ∈ T,
(s y1 , . . . , s
y
m , s
z
1, . . . , s
z
n, s
u
1 , . . . , s
u
r ) ∈ S, (12)
where 
, M, T, S are polyhedra formed by systems of linear constraints, includ-
ing (1), (2), as well as by systems analogous to (2) for the variables z˜ and u˜
(which are presented in [15]). As before, here ˜ y = ( y, . . . ,  y; 0, . . . , 0), ˜z =(
z, . . . , z; 0, . . . , 0), ˜u = (u, . . . , u; 0, . . . , 0) are vectors whose all non-zero
components equal 1, and 〈˜ y, y˜〉i , 〈˜z, z˜〉 j , 〈˜u, u˜〉k are parts of the scalar products
〈˜ y, y˜〉 , 〈˜z, z˜〉 , 〈˜u, u˜〉, respectively, relating to industrial customer i , utility com-
pany j , and group of advanced customers k, i ∈ 1,m, j ∈ 1, n, k ∈ 1, r , respectively,
whereas, as before,  y, z , and uare vectors of corresponding dimensions with all the
components equal 1, whereas ˜ y, ˜z, ˜u have the same dimensions as do the vectors
y˜, z˜, u˜, respectively.
Though finding equilibria in this game by known game theory methods presents
considerable difficulties, it turns out that this game possesses certain features allowing
one to develop effective methods for finding these equilibria (in solvable games) [15].
Components of an equilibrium point of (solvable) game (12) determine a) (corre-
sponding to this equilibrium point) the optimal hourly volumes of electricity to be
bought by each of the large customers of the grid (i.e., by industrial customers, utility
companies, and groups of advanced customers) and the optimal hourly production
volume of electricity for the generator, b) the optimal hourly volumes of electricity to
be received by each of the large customers of the grid from the suppliers (i.e., from the
electricity producers who transform wind and solar energy into electric energy), c) the
optimal hourly volumes of electricity to be stored by each large customer of the grid,
d) the optimal hourly prices for electricity to be paid by the large customers to the
generator, as well as those to be paid to the suppliers, within 24h, and e) the optimal
hourly prices to be paid to the transmission company both by the generator and by
each large customer. Since the (solvable) game may have more than one equilibrium
point, one should bear in mind that, generally, there could be more than one optimal
set of the above volumes and prices to choose from (each set corresponding to each
equilibrium point).
Remark 4 Game (12), describing the interaction of all the grid customers, the genera-
tor, and the transmission company, does not, generally, reflect the fact that the prices at
which the generator charges the customers for the electricity supplied to them depend
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on the prices at which the transmission company charges the generator for transmitting
electricity to the grid customers. Indeed, themodel does not take into consideration the
fact that if the above transmission prices for the generator are high, the generator may
need to increase the electricity prices for the customers. This increase, in turn, may
affect the volumes of electricity that the customers may decide to purchase from the
generator, as well as both the revenue of the transmission company (if the customers
decide the decrease the volumes of electricity purchased from the generator) and its
prices for transmitting electricity to the customers. However, the model to a certain
extent acceptably covers the following two important cases of the above interaction: a)
The case in which the transmission company charges only the customers for the elec-
tricity transmitted (to them), which means that the equalities θ y = 0, θ z = 0, θu = 0
hold, and b) the case in which the polyhedra S and T are described by the same system
of linear inequalities. In the latter case, one should bear in mind that by solving Game
12, the generator tries to estimate parameters of its potential contractual agreements
with the grid customers. By doing so the generator may assume that the customers
would agree that the prices for transmitting electricity to them from the generator,
which the generator pays to the transmission company, and the ones at which the cus-
tomers are charged by the transmission company for the electricity receivedmay differ
as long as they are chosen from the same set of these prices (being the polyhedron
S = T ) [40].
To reflect the above dependence between the prices described by the vectors
p˜y, p˜z, p˜u and θ y, θ z, θu , one should study games with a more complicated struc-
ture of the payoff function of the generator than that in Game 12. More complicated
games should also be studied if one takes into consideration that expenses of the trans-
mission company for transmitting electricity from the generator to the grid customers
may also depend on the volume of the electricity transmitted, as well as on its services
rendered to both each particular large grid customer and customers other than large
grid customers. However, studying such games requires an appropriate justification
(besides simple curiosity), and, in any case, the consideration of these games lies
beyond the scope of the present paper.
4 Concluding Remarks
1. The proposedmathematical model of interacting the generator with the transmission
company, and with the three groups of (large) grid customers allows one to describe a
hypothetical case of supply-demand relations between all the interacting participants
of the grid that assumes that both the supply and the demand can change every hour.
However, the proposed model allows one to calculate an optimal schedule of the
electricity supply in the frameworkofwhich a) the generator produces the same amount
of electricity hourly (though not necessarily the same amount for different base load
power plants comprising the generator if it consists of more than one base load power
plant), i.e., when all the base load power plants that comprise the generator produce
the same amount of electricity hourly combined, and b) all the electricity sold by the
generator is consumed by the customers (directly or via their electricity storages). To
this end, one should include the equalities
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Y g(l) = Y g(l + 1), l ∈ 1, 23 (13)
in the description of the set 
 (which is assumed to be compatible in solving game
(12), including the case in which the system of constraints (13) is included in the
description of the set 
).
Here, all the base load power plants comprising the generator produce the same
(though, generally, different for different base load plants) volume of electricity com-
bined hourly, whereas the peaking power plants comprising the peaking power facility
take care of the excess of the hourly customer demand over the hourly supply that is
provided by the base load power plants. Also, one can see that this (equilibrium) hourly
supply from the base load power plants (calculated as a result of solving game (12))
is balanced by the storage facilities available to the customers so that if this supply
exceeds any current customer demand, electricity produced by these plants may go to
these storage facilities.
As mentioned in Remark 2, for each generating facility ξ, ξ ∈ 1, 	 that is part of
the generator, a production schedule corresponding to an optimal supply of electricity
by the generator as a whole can be found by modifying the system of constraints
describing the set 
. This is possible since a part of coordinates of every vector from

 forms a vector whose coordinates reflect the production strategies of the generator.
Let
Y gξ (l) be the volume of electricity produced by facility ξ (which is a base load
power plant) as part of the generator, ξ ∈ 1, 	, in the period of time from hour l − 1
to hour l, l ∈ 1, 24,
H ξmin be the technologically possible minimal volume of electricity production by
base load power plant ξ, ξ ∈ 1, 	,
H ξmax be the technologically possible maximal volume of electricity production by
base load power plant ξ, ξ ∈ 1, 	.
Then the following constraints should be added to system (9):
Y gξ (l − 1) = Y gξ (l), ξ ∈ 1, 	, l ∈ 1, 24,
H ξmin ≤ Y gξ (l) ≤ H ξmax , ξ ∈ 1, 	, l ∈ 1, 24
	∑
ξ=1
Y gξ (l) = Y g(l), l ∈ 1, 24,
	∑
ξ=1
H ξmin = Hmin,
	∑
ξ=1
H ξmax = Hmax ,
2. Based upon the optimal volumes and prices for electricity for each utility company
from all the sources of electricity available in the grid, each utility company can
then easily determine the prices for the households that this company supplies with
electricity. One should, however, bear in mind that each household and each group of
households may use individual devices (systems) to transform solar and wind energy
into electricity, as well as individual devices (systems) for storing electricity. This may
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substantially affect the volumes of electricity that the corresponding utility company
should buy from both the generator and the suppliers [15].
3. The structure of the goal function of the transmission company depends on its
contractual agreementswith the generator, industrial customers, utility companies, and
groups of advanced customers. Generally, the transmission company can charge both
the generator and each large customer of the grid under consideration that uses high
voltage lines to receive electricity from the generator. In this paper, the goal function of
the transmission company reflects this particular case, i.e., the transmission company
charges both the generator and all the customers of the grid that use the transmission
lines though at different rates, which may depend on the transmission distance.
4.One should bear inmind that inGame (12), the use of renewable sources of energy
and storage systems is considered a possible strategy of each (large) customer of the
grid. However, proceeding from its expenses associated with producing electricity
(described earlier in this paper), the generator may develop (or purchase) its own
electricity storage facility (or even both an electricity storage facility and systems
for transforming wind and solar energy into electricity) or at least may explore the
expediency of having them in use. Both options may be explored in the framework of
the proposed model, describing the interaction of all the grid elements, as long as the
generator properly forms the system of constraints describing the vectors p˜y, p˜z , and
p˜u . (It is easy to modify game (12) to take into account the possibility of incorporating
in themodel, for instance, a description of the functioning of a hydro-electricity storage
facility that the generator may be interested in using.)
The conventional wisdom suggests that, currently, storing electricity in large vol-
umes by the grid customers is not economical, and this viewpoint substantially affects
the way the electrical grid operates [43–45]. However, it is unclear why electricity
should necessarily be stored in large volumes in particular storages while the same
volumes of electric energy could be stored in a set of distributed, relatively small stor-
ages like accumulator batteries. These batteries can collectively be used by a certain
number of neighboring households, which may turn out to be economical even if the
use of the same small storages by individual households under the current prices of
the available storage devices is not. So quantitatively evaluating how much of electric
energy (if any) would be reasonable to store by the households (when the electricity
offered by the generator is relatively cheap) and then to release (during the hours
when it is expensive) makes sense under various possible schemes of using relatively
small electricity storage facilities [46] and under both the existing and any expected
prices for the electricity storage systems and devices. Certainly, the effectiveness of
each type of electricity storing systems much depends on the volume of electricity
that is lost there as a result of storing electricity, i.e., on the coefficient of the storing
system performance, which should be analyzed for each type of electricity storages in
adopting decisions on their deployment.
Finally, in this paper, the functioning of the storage facilities that the (large) grid
customers can use was described by a simplified mathematical model, corresponding
mostly to large storage facilities, such as, for instance, water reservoirs (in which
the potential energy of the water pumped into the reservoir can be transformed into
electric energy). However, the physics of the functioning of, say, chemical batteries
suggests that this model can be viewed as an acceptable first approximation of the
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description of the functioning for other storage systems. The reasons for choosing
this simplified model were a) to bring into step the mathematical description of the
storage facilities and the relations of the balance kind that are used in the other parts
of the model, and b) to be able to mathematically formulate the problem of finding
optimal (equilibrium) strategies of both the producers of electricity and the (large) grid
customers that interact within the grid as a problem from a class of large-scale ones
that can effectively be solved. As mentioned earlier and shown in [47], with the use
of this model, (solvable) games describing the above interaction can be solved on the
basis of linear programming techniques, which have high computational potential.
5. One can easily be certain that by introducing additional variables and constraints
in the proposed game model, one can extend this model to cover the option of buying
electricity by the large grid customers in electricity markets and delivering it to the
customers either via the same transmission company or via a different transmission
company.However, other game-theoretic problems solvable by different optimizations
techniques may be formulated based on other models describing the interaction of the
large grid customers with both the electricity producers and the electricity market
[23,48,49].
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